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Abstract
Institutional barriers to entry were removed to a considerable extent in 1996 in the Dutch retail
sector to enhance market dynamics. Three years before that the regulator decided to not take legal
actions anymore against entrants violating institutional requirements. In the current analysis we
investigate the effects of the deregulation during that 1993–1995 period using a recently developed
model by Carree and Thurik (1999). The results show that the equilibrium number of firms and the
adjustment speed from the disequilibrium number of firms to the equilibrium number have both
increased. The results also show that the increase in the speed of adjustment is the consequence of
lowering barriers to entry. © 2001 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.
JEL classification: K23; L50; L81
Keywords: Deregulation; Entry barriers; Retailing
1. Introduction
Starting a retail venture was subject to important institutional requirements in the Neth-
erlands up till 1996. The institutional entry requirements in Dutch retailing were based upon
a forty year old law, the Vestigingswet Bedrijven 1954, which applied to the start up of a
company or a new establishment. The main goal of the law was to promote an adequate
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conduct of business. ‘Adequate’ conduct concerned protecting consumers from incompe-
tence and having sound book-keeping. Starting a new company or establishment required at
least the middenstandsdiploma. The middenstandsdiploma is a retailer’s certificate which
covers basic commercial and accounting skills. For most shoptypes additional certificates
were required with respect to professional skills. These are shoptype-specific requirements
for which additional schooling is needed.1 Moreover, the demarcation of shoptypes, with
every shoptype its own professional (entry-)requirements, was on a very disaggregated level
and had become outdated, i.e. related to production techniques of the 1950s. Because for
many retail activities, professional skills were required, this strongly limited the freedom to
enter, to diversify and to pursue even closely related entrepreneurial activities.
The institutional requirements were an important barrier to entry in the retail sector in the
Netherlands. International comparative studies show that the institutional requirements for
starting entrepreneurs in the Netherlands were one of the highest within Europe (EIM, 1993).
Besides the institutional requirements, other barriers to start a retail venture are relatively
low. The setting up of a shop generally demands much less capital, time and knowledge
investment than starting an enterprise in manufacturing. This is due to the more limited size
of retail shops and the more clearly structured retail market environment resulting from the
limited impact of innovations and international competition.
Despite concerns of representatives of incumbent retailers, the Dutch government decided
to lower the institutional barriers to entry in order to enhance market performance.2 A key
aim of the deregulation was to increase market dynamics by simplifying (new) entry. The
new law results in a decrease of the height of entry barriers in three ways. First, the
middenstandsdiploma was replaced by a retailer’s certificate (called AOV) for which the
workload in terms of study hours is reduced (from about 240 hr to about 120 hr). Second,
in the new law only for a very limited number of shoptypes additional certificates with
respect to professional skills are still required.3 Third, such requirements are no longer
related to separate establishments and shoptypes, but to companies and clusters of shoptypes.
This leaves retailers much more flexible in diversifying into related entrepreneurial activities.
Although the institutional entry requirements were changed in 1996, it was already
announced in mid 1992 that from the 1st of January 1993 on, there would be no (criminal)
prosecution by the regulator anymore. We investigate for this first period, 1993–1995, the
effects of deregulation on entry, exit and number of shops in retail markets. For this we use
an extension of a recently developed model by Carree and Thurik (1999). This model allows
for the measurement of the speed of adjustment towards the equilibrium average number of
firms in local retail markets and the computation of the contributions of entry flows and exit
flows to this adjustment process. Additionally, the change in the equilibrium number of firms
resulting from deregulation can be estimated.
Aggregate data on entry and exit rates of entrepreneurs in Dutch retailing suggest that
market dynamics have increased in the period 1993–1995. Bosma and Zwinkels (1999)
provide data showing that the average new entry rate in the retail sector increased by 28%
when comparing the 1993–1995 period with the 1987–1992 period. The average exit rate
increased as well, by 22%. In the current paper we provide statistics on the effect of
deregulation at the much more disaggregate level of shoptypes (retail industries). We use
data of 23 shoptypes covering the period 1981–1995. The rest of the paper is organized as
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follows. In Section 2 we develop our error correction model which we use to measure the
deregulation effects. Section 3 is used to describe the panel data set and some basic statistics
of the Dutch retail sector. In Section 4 we present the empirical results and Section 5
concludes.
2. The model
Retailing constitutes a relatively simple entrepreneurial activity. There are no huge
barriers to entry although there are several factors which may lengthen the time between
deciding to start a retail venture and the actual entry. Such factors may include finding an
adequate sales outlet, arranging credit and passing the exam(s) for retailer’s certificates. A
clear indication that entry barriers in the retail sector are not very high, is the limited
difference between the rewards for running a store and the average wage level. Carree and
Thurik (1999) report that the average reward for entrepreneurial activities in Dutch retailing
in the 1980s has been about 50% more than that for the activities of a (modal) employee. In
case retail profits increase relative to the wage level we expect an increase in the (net) entry
rate, while in the reverse case we expect more (net) exit.
Carree and Thurik (1999) model the retail market structure as follows. They assume that
each local retail market has an equilibrium number of enterprises, N*. This equilibrium
number is determined, among others, by a critical profit level, p* and total market demand,
Q. A decrease in the critical profit level that entrepreneurs expect for their activities or as
compensation for the entrepreneurial risks, leads to an increase in the equilibrium number of
firms. An increase in demand also increases the equilibrium number of firms:
vp 5
›N*
›p*
p*
N* , 0 (1)
vQ 5
›N*
›Q
Q
N* . 0 (2)
Carree and Thurik also derive from their (oligopoly) model that nQ should be smaller than
0.5 (p. 989). The change in the equilibrium number of firms from one period to another can
be approximated by:4
gt 5
DN*t
N*t21
< a 1 vp
Dp*t
p*t21
1 vQ
DQt
Qt21
(3)
The parameter a is incorporated to correct for a structural development in the equilibrium
number of firms. The Dutch retail sector has gone through a period of concentration for the
past decades (Nooteboom, 1986). Supermarkets have gained market share at the expense of
specialized food stores like butchers and greengrocers. Not every shoptype may have
suffered to the same extent from such developments, so the structural development parameter
may differ across shoptypes. The most important distinction is that between food and
nonfood shoptypes, because food shoptypes will have suffered most strongly from the
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increased market shares of supermarkets. We will therefore present results for those two
separate groups of shoptypes.
Carree and Thurik assume that entrepreneurs adjust for disequilibria as these are charac-
terized by profit opportunities. This reasoning is in line with the Kirznerian notion of
entrepreneurial activity resulting from the perception of available opportunities to make
profits (Kirzner, 1973, 1979, 1997). They derive under certain assumptions that the actual
number of firms is determined by an error correction model of the form:
Dln~Nt! 5 gt~ln~N*t21! 2 ln~Nt21!! (4)
An extension to the Carree and Thurik model is that we assume that the speed of adjustment
parameter gt is time-dependent. We make this extension as we expect the speed of adjust-
ment before and after the deregulation to be different. We do not know the value of the
equilibrium number of firms, but we may derive Eq. (5) from Eq. (4):
Dln~Nt! 2
gt
gt21
Dln~Nt21! 5 gt~Dln~N*t21! 2 Dln~Nt21!! (5)
Considering that ln(1 1 x) ’ x when x is small and adding a disturbance term, we have:
D
DNt
Nt21
5
gt 2 gt21
gt21
DNt21
Nt22
1 gtS gt21 2 DNt21Nt22 D 1 et (6)
We make the following assumptions about the speed of adjustment parameter gt and the
critical level of profits p*t. We assume that gt takes two values, gB before the deregulation (up
till 1992) and gA after the deregulation (from 1993 on). We assume that the critical level of
profits p*t is constant in both regulation periods, but not for the deregulation date (1st of
January 1993) when it shifts downwards. The general real wage index in the Netherlands
barely changed during the period of investigation, which indicates that an assumption of a
constant p*t should not pose a problem. However, due to the deregulation measures retail
ventures have become easier to start. It is therefore likely that the critical level of profit
(compared to the wage level) to enter has gone down. So, Eq. (6) has a different expression
before, during and after the deregulation year (1993):5
D
DNt
Nt21
5 gBSa 1 vQDQt21Qt22 2 DNt21Nt22 D 1 et t , 1993 (7a)
D
DNt
Nt21
5
gA 2 gB
gB
DNt21
Nt22
1 gASa 1 b 1 vQDQt21Qt22 2 DNt21Nt22 D 1 et t 5 1993(7b)
D
DNt
Nt21
5 gASa 1 vQDQt21Qt22 2 DNt21Nt22 D 1 et t . 1993 (7c)
where b is equal to npDp*1993/p*1992. Our two main hypotheses with regard to the effects of
the deregulation are that the deregulation leads to an increase in the adjustment speed and to
an increase in the equilibrium number of firms.6
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H1: gA 2 gB . 0
H2: b . 0
Carree and Thurik also derive how the flows of gross entry and gross exit contribute to the
adjustment process towards the equilibrium number. For example, in case the actual number
exceeds the equilibrium number of firms, adjustment may take place due to decreasing entry
rates or due to increasing exit rates. The relative importance of entry and exit in the
adjustment process can be estimated by replacing D(DNt /Nt21) in Eqs. (7a) and (7c) by
D(Entt /Nt21) and D(Extt /Nt21), respectively. The variables Entt and Extt represent the gross
number of entrants and exiting firms, and DNt 5 Entt 2 Extt. The Eqs. (8a) through (9b)
show the equations to be estimated:7
D
Entt
Nt21
5 gB
ESa 1 vQDQt21Qt22 2 DNt21Nt22 D 1 etE t , 1993 (8a)
D
Entt
Nt21
5 gA
ESa 1 vQDQt21Qt22 2 DNt21Nt22 D 1 etE t . 1993 (8b)
D
Extt
Nt21
5 gB
XSa 1 vQDQt21Qt22 2 DNt21Nt22 D 1 etX t , 1993 (9a)
D
Extt
Nt21
5 gA
XSa 1 vQDQt21Qt22 2 DNt21Nt22 D 1 etX t . 1993 (9b)
Eqs. (8) and (9) are a system of two equations where the error terms etE and etX are expected
to be positively correlated. Our hypotheses with regard to the effect of the deregulation are
that the contribution of entry to the adjustment process increases while there is no ex ante
reason to assume that the adjustment parameter for exit would become different.
H3: gAE 2 gBE . 0
H4: gAX 2 gBX 5 0
3. The data
The retail sector has an important contribution to the Dutch economy. It accounted for
about 23% of the total number of economically active enterprises and for about 13% of the
total labor force in the Dutch private sector in 1988 (Bode, 1990). The vividity of entry and
exit movements of establishments in Dutch retailing has been relatively high. The average
gross entry rate per annum across all shoptypes in our sample is 8.5% while the average gross
exit rate is 9.5%. Entry and exit rates of establishments in shoptypes are also highly
correlated (average correlation coefficient of 0.66). This implies that shoptypes which have
high entry rates can also be expected to have high exit rates and vice versa. It is in accordance
with Dunne et al. (1988) who present an overview of entry and exit rates in U.S. manufac-
turing industries.
The data concerning demand changes for products sold in shoptypes (DQt21/Qt22 in the
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model) are compiled from two data sources from Statistics Netherlands (CBS). The first data
source is the yearly survey on household expenditures shares. The yearly survey sample size
is several thousands of households and the surveys should therefore present a reliable picture
of the structural developments of the expenditure shares. Nevertheless, there appear to be
some changes in the expenditure shares data from one year to another, especially in small
expenditure classes, which should be subscribed to sample variation. We corrected for that
by estimating a linear approximation to the expenditure shares data. That is, we estimated the
equation ESjt 5 aj 1 bjt 1 ejt, where ES stands for Expenditure Share (the sum of all
expenditures is 1000), j for shoptype and t for time, and constructed the fitted series ES jtfit 5
aˆj 5 bˆjt (see also Appendix A). This equation is estimated for each shoptype separately. Note
that the sum of the expenditure shares for the shoptypes does not add to 1000 as total
expenditures include many more categories like insurance, heating, transport, etc. which are
not included. Finally, the demand changes for products sold are computed as DQt /Qt21 5
{ES jtfit(1 1 GCSt) 2 ES j,t21fit }/ES j,t21fit where GCS stands for Growth of total Consumer
Spending. Data for these percentages of growth are given in Table 1. The data show that the
final years of the sample, during which the deregulation was announced, do not show
extraordinarily high or low growth figures.
The net entry, gross entry and gross exit rates have been compiled using data on numbers
of entering and exiting establishments and total number of establishments from the Central
Registration Office (CRK) in The Hague. Note that we use entry and exit of establishments
instead of companies, because the institutional requirements before deregulation were ap-
plied to establishments instead of to companies. The data are on a shoptype level in which
establishments sell relatively homogeneous goods. An overview of the shoptypes together
with average entry and exit rates is given in the Appendix. For 21 shoptypes we have
available data over the 1981–1995 period (15 observations). For one shoptype (textiles) the
data became available at a more disaggregated level from 1989 on. Therefore, we have 8
observations for the ‘textiles’ shoptype from 1981 to 1988. For the 1990–1995 period (6
observations) we use data for two shoptypes which were originally included in the ‘textiles’
shoptype: men’s clothing stores and furnishing stores. This makes a total of 335 observa-
tions. The data given in the Appendix show that shoptypes for which the expenditure shares
have tended to decrease relatively strongly, like for the butcher’s shops and the dairy shops,
also show clearly negative average net entry rates.
4. Empirical results
In this section the empirical results of Eqs. (7), (8) and (9) are presented. Table 2 shows
the estimation results for the net entry Eq. (7). In the first column of the table the results are
presented when taking all observations into account. The speed of adjustment before the
deregulation is estimated to be 0.531. This means that more than half of the disequilibrium
is corrected for within a one-year period. After the deregulation the speed of adjustment
parameter increases by 0.138, but this increase is not significant at the 10% level. The
structural trend in the equilibrium number of firms in retailing over the 1981–1995 period is
negative and significant. However, the deregulation has led to an increase of this number (the
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coefficient for b is positive and significant). This increase is equivalent to the negative of
more than three years, on average, of structural decrease. Therefore, while we find evidence
for the second hypothesis of a temporary increase in the equilibrium number of firms to be
valid, we fail to find sound evidence for the first hypothesis of an increased speed of
adjustment.
In the second column of the table we show the results when leaving out one of the
shoptypes, viz. the furniture stores. This shoptype has the largest average floorspace per firm
of all shoptypes in the sample. This indicates that entry barriers with respect to capital
investment may be quite large. Therefore, we expect the deregulation to have had much less
effect on the barriers to entry in this shoptype when compared to the rest of the shoptypes
in our sample. The estimated increase in the adjustment parameter after the deregulation date
is indeed higher when leaving the Furniture Stores out of the data set. The coefficient of
0.194 is significant at the 5% level. That is, there is some evidence for the first hypothesis
to be valid.
It is likely that average adjustment rates and the structural development in the carrying
capacity differ between shoptypes. When we split the sample in food and nonfood shoptypes
we find that the results differ considerably both with respect to the structural trend of the
Table 1
Real growth of total consumer expenditures (1980–1994)
Year Growth Year Growth Year Growth
1980 20.4% 1985 2.8% 1990 4.2%
1981 23.0% 1986 2.6% 1991 3.1%
1982 20.5% 1987 2.7% 1992 2.5%
1983 1.0% 1988 0.8% 1993 1.0%
1984 1.2% 1989 3.5% 1994 2.2%
Table 2
Estimation results for the net entry equation (7)
No Furniture No 1993 Non-Food Food
gB 0.531 0.513 0.508 0.512 0.602
(11.57) (11.30) (9.48) (8.82) (7.76)
gA2gB 0.138 0.194 0.204 0.296 20.017
(1.48) (2.12) (1.66) (2.15) (0.12)
a 20.008 20.009 20.008 20.005 20.013
(3.57) (4.08) (3.33) (1.77) (3.67)
b 0.027 0.029 0.016 0.035
(3.59) (4.14) (1.82) (2.80)
nQ 0.334 0.317 0.345 0.349 0.326
(4.17) (4.13) (4.11) (1.83) (3.42)
R2 0.301 0.314 0.300 0.289 0.348
N 335 320 312 200 135
Note: Absolute t-values in parentheses. In the second column the shoptype Furniture Stores is left out. In the
third column the year 1993 is left out (to facilitate comparison with the results in Table 3) and in the last two
columns we show results for the non-food and food shoptypes separately.
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equilibrium number of firms and with respect to the change in the adjustment speed after the
deregulation in 1993. The structural decline in the equilibrium number of firms is clearly
visible in food stores and more than twice as large as in nonfood stores. The food stores have
lost important market share to supermarkets during the 1981–1995 period in the Netherlands.
The adjustment speed seems to be unaffected by the deregulation for the food shoptypes,
while it has had a large effect for the nonfood shoptypes. One reason may be that there are
still some additional institutional requirements in food shoptypes like Bakers and Butchers
to ensure that consumers can purchase food products without health hazards. There are also
food shoptypes like Dairy Shops and Tobacco Shops which have been losing market share
to supermarkets for year after year and for which entry has failed to become more attractive
due to deregulation. The results for the two separate groups can be found in the last two
columns of Table 2.
Now we turn to the estimation of the system of two Eqs. (8) and (9). As we suspect the
error term to be correlated, we use the method of Seemingly Unrelated Regression. The
estimation results can be found in Table 3. The estimated correlation coefficient of the error
terms of the two equations for the total sample is 0.35. We find for the total sample that there
is an increase in the adjustment speed for entry but not for exit. The increase found in Table
2 can therefore be contributed to relaxation of entry regulations. In accordance with the
results for net entry, there are differences between food and nonfood shoptypes. Adjustment
through entry has been clearly positively affected for the group of nonfood shoptypes but not
so for the group of food shoptypes. In accordance with the results for net entry, we find
evidence for the third hypothesis that the ease of entry has increased after the deregulation.
However, this evidence is limited to the sub sample of nonfood shoptypes. We cannot reject
the fourth hypothesis of the ease of exit not to be affected by the deregulation measures.
Before the deregulation date the role of exit in the adjustment process was somewhat more
Table 3
Estimation results for the system of entry and exit equations (8) and (9)
No Furniture Non-Food Food
gB
E 0.228 0.219 0.179 0.305
(4.65) (4.34) (3.15) (3.38)
gA
E 2 gB
E 0.209 0.235 0.419 20.095
(1.91) (2.15) (3.13) (0.52)
gB
X 20.277 20.284 20.265 20.320
(6.16) (6.09) (5.41) (3.68)
gA
X 2 gB
X 0.007 0.011 0.035 20.015
(0.07) (0.11) (0.32) (0.08)
a 20.009 20.010 20.007 20.013
(3.69) (4.19) (2.28) (3.74)
nQ 0.337 0.328 0.346 0.327
(4.02) (4.06) (1.43) (3.34)
RE2 0.119 0.122 0.167 0.089
RX2 0.121 0.124 0.152 0.114
N 312 298 186 126
Note: Absolute t-values in parentheses. In the second column the shoptype Furniture Stores is left out. In the
last two columns we show results for the non-food and food shoptypes separately.
232 M. Carree, J. Nijkamp / Journal of Economics and Business 53 (2001) 225–235
important than that of entry, while after the deregulation date this has clearly reversed. In
fact, the contribution of entry to the total adjustment speed after the deregulation is more than
one and a half times as large as that of exit (0.44 versus 0.27, total 0.71).8 See the third
column of Table 2 for comparison.
5. Conclusions
The current paper investigates the effects of the 1993 deregulation for the Dutch retail
sector. From the 1st January of 1993 on the regulator decided not to take legal actions
anymore against entrants violating institutional requirements. Three years later the institu-
tional barriers to entry were officially relaxed. We investigate the effect of the deregulation
during the period 1993–1995 during which legal actions were abandoned. Our results can be
summarized as follows. There seems to be clear evidence for an increase in the ease of entry
for nonfood shoptypes. For food shoptypes we do not find such an increase. For both food
and nonfood shoptypes we find an increase in the equilibrium number of firms per local
market. There appears to have been no impact on the ease of exit during the period under
investigation.
We note that these results are preliminary in the sense that only the first three years after
the deregulation have been investigated. Future research should throw light on the questions
whether the increase in market dynamics was temporary or structural. Bosma and Zwinkels
(1999) provide data for 1996 showing that for the total retail sector entry declines from 1995
to 1996 and exit increases somewhat. It may indicate that the period of 1993–1995 will turn
out to be a cohort of entrants which is less successful than cohorts before the deregulation
period. Research into the deregulation efforts which are taking place in retailing in other
European countries would also provide much additional information about the extent to
which deregulation affects market dynamics in the retail sector.
Notes
1. For instance, to start up a hairdresser’s shop one needed a certificate from the
hair-dressing school next to the middenstandsdiploma.
2. We do not provide a discussion of the economic literature concerning deregulation. See
Phillips (1985) and Winston (1993) for some discussions on the consequences of
deregulation.
3. These are baker’s shops, butcher’s shops, fish shops and poultry shops. The poultry
shops are not included in our data set.
4. Carree and Thurik (1996) provide an overview of empirical studies into the determi-
nants of entry and exit. In the majority of studies that consider net entry a significant
positive effect of (lagged) profitability and (lagged) growth is found.
5. A statistical test of the timing of the impact of the deregulation is not pursued in our
analysis because we lack enough postderegulation time period data. The deregulation
effect might take a couple of years to fully develop. This implies that there should be
more equations like (7b) for years like 1994 and 1995.
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6. Note that the effects of the regulatory change on adjustment speed need not go together
with that on the equilibrium number of firms.
7. Note that we do not take the year 1993 into account in the estimation of Eqs. (8) and
(9). This is a consequence of gross entry and exit to be determined only partly from
adjustment towards equilibrium as in Eq. (4). A large share of entry and exit is
turbulence, the extent of which is likely to change in 1993 as well. It is not possible to
identify the shift in the growth rate of the equilibrium number of firms (parameter 3b)
apart from the shift in the extent of turbulence. See Carree and Thurik (1999, p. 992)
for more details.
8. Note that these results are based upon two postderegulation years, 1994 and 1995. The
increased contribution of entry to the total adjustment speed may be partly temporary.
Appendix. Average entry and exit rates and coefficients of fitted demand
equation
Table A1:
Summary statistics for the shoptypes
Shoptype entry ratea exit ratea aˆjb bˆjb
grocers/supermarkets 0.083 0.104 203.18 21.62
greengrocers 0.081 0.097 28.77 20.35
liquor stores 0.086 0.110 17.68 20.24
men’s clothing storesc 0.045 0.083 16.88 20.30
shoe stores 0.078 0.083 12.00 20.05
furniture stores 0.126 0.119 19.43 20.13
furnishing storesc 0.114 0.104 11.80 20.02
furnishing/furniture stores (mixed) 0.064 0.083 38.01 0.04
bicycle stores 0.046 0.058 3.91 0.05
jewelleries 0.086 0.082 2.71 0.02
drug stores 0.067 0.063 10.90 0.38
florists 0.122 0.114 6.59 20.02
butcher’s shops 0.075 0.093 26.04 20.70
dairy shops 0.051 0.091 32.79 21.69
fish shops 0.118 0.109 3.06 20.03
baker’s shops 0.072 0.082 13.32 20.21
confectioners 0.113 0.117 13.91 20.03
tobacco shops 0.042 0.079 12.76 20.26
household goods shops 0.094 0.095 8.00 20.08
paint, glass and wall-paper stores 0.057 0.078 4.93 20.08
hardware stores 0.066 0.081 5.51 20.06
photographer’s shops 0.092 0.082 6.07 20.10
pet shops 0.101 0.096 6.43 0.01
textiles storesd 0.125 0.117 63.38 20.98
a averages over the 1980–1995 period
b coefficients of the fitted expenditure share equation ES jtfit 5 aˆj 1 bˆjt over the 1979–1995 period
c entry and exit rates are averages over the 1989–1995 period
d entry and exit rates are averages over the 1980–1988 period
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